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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Following hints in the writings of Isaiah Berlin, some political 
theorists hold that the thesis of value pluralism is true and that this truth 
provides support for political liberalism of a sort that prescribes wide 
guarantees of individual liberty.1  There are many different goods, and 
they are incommensurable.  Hence, people should be left free to live 
their own lives as they choose so long as they do not harm others in 
certain ways.  In a free society, there is a strong presumption in favor of 
letting individuals act as they choose without interference by others.  
 
 *  Professor of Philosophy, University of California, San Diego. 
 1. ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 
(1969). 
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William A. Galston has developed this argument with exemplary clarity.2  
He is wrong.  The idea that value incommensurability is a reason for 
toleration of diverse ways of life and protection of the individual’s 
freedom to choose among diverse ways of life is a mistake. 
In his paper for this issue, What Value Pluralism Means for Legal-
Constitutional Orders, Galston undertakes to resolve a further problem, 
namely, whether the presumption in favor of individual liberty that value 
pluralism establishes can be kept within bounds.  In his words, “Within 
the pluralist framework, how is the basis for a viable political community to 
be secured?”3  On one construal of these words, Galston is seeking the 
solution to a nonproblem.  Value pluralism does not establish any normative 
presumption in favor of liberty, so the worry “does this presumption 
hold without limit,” or “are there good reasons that constrain it at some 
point,” is otiose.  On another construal, Galston is addressing a different 
question: if most of the members of society came to believe that given 
value pluralism, they ought to be left free to live according to their own 
conception of values, then would a “decently ordered public life” be 
impossible to sustain?4  On the second construal, the issue being posed is 
a genuine empirical question, which philosophical arguments cannot 
answer. 
II.  FROM VALUE PLURALISM TO LIBERALISM? 
Here is a statement of the argument from value pluralism to 
liberalism: 
[T]here are multiple goods that differ qualitatively from one another and which 
cannot be rank-ordered.  If this is the case, there is no single way of life, based on a 
singular ordering of values, that is the highest and best for all individuals.  This 
has important implications for politics.  While states may legitimately act to prevent 
the great evils of human existence, they may not seek to force their citizens into one-
size-fits-all patterns of desirable human lives.  Any public policy that relies on, 
promotes, or commands a single conception of human good or excellence as 
equally valid for all individuals is on its face illegitimate.5 
Let us call the political order that massively restricts individual liberty 
in violation of the political ideal of liberalism the “Stalinist alternative.”  
The term is deliberately pejorative.  The question is, does value pluralism 
 
 2. WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PLURALISM: THE IMPLICATIONS OF VALUE 
PLURALISM FOR POLITICAL THEORY AND PRACTICE (2002). 
 3. William A. Galston, What Value Pluralism Means for Legal-Constitutional 
Orders, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 803, 806 (2009). 
 4. Id. 
 5. William A. Galston, The Idea of Political Pluralism, in MORAL UNIVERSALISM 
AND PLURALISM 95, 96 (Henry S. Richardson & Melissa S. Williams eds., 2009). 
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rule out Stalinism?  Does value pluralism provide any reason at all, place 
even a small weight on the scales, in favor of liberalism? 
We should straightaway acknowledge that value pluralism and value 
incommensurability rule out one possible type of argument for 
Stalinism.  No massive program of state coercion to organize society to 
maximize the achievement of any single good or combination of goods 
can be justified by appeal to the premise that goods can be rank ordered 
and that the good—or combination of goods—we are promoting ranks 
highest.  But this acknowledgement concedes nothing to those who see 
value pluralism as supporting the entrenchment of liberalism.  The 
situation is symmetrical.  If value pluralism and incommensurability take 
away this premise that might be deployed in an argument to reject 
liberalism, then they equally take away this premise from the arsenal of 
their opponents.  If goods cannot be rank ordered, then any claim that 
asserts or presupposes that goods can be rank ordered is false and cannot 
be deployed successfully in an argument to support liberalism. 
Maybe value-pluralism-and-incommensurability is an arrow that only 
fits the bows of Stalinists, and is only useful to them, so removing this 
arrow from the stock of arms available to both enemies and advocates of 
liberalism hurts the enemies and helps the advocates.  In this way 
asymmetry is restored.  However, it is just not true that no plausible 
arguments for liberalism depend on the claims that goods can be rank 
ordered and that there is a conception of human good or excellence 
equally valid for all individuals.  We need not search the libraries for 
such arguments; they are ready at hand.  In On Liberty, John Stuart Mill 
argues from perfectionistic utilitarianism to a strong principle entrenching 
individual liberty.6  Mill famously urges that human nature is various, so 
there are different types of people.  It may even be that the innate 
personality and trait potential of each person are unique, so there are as 
many different types of persons as there are individual persons.  What 
mode of life would be suitable for a person, would give her a good 
prospect of attaining a good life, depends on the type of person she is.  
Moreover, an individual’s own type is not transparent—not to other 
people, and not even to the person herself.  Hence each person in order 
 
 6. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., Yale 
Univ. Press 2003) (1859) [hereinafter MILL, ON LIBERTY].  For Mill’s perfectionistic 
version of utilitarianism, see especially his discussion of higher and lower pleasures in 
JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 6–25 (George Sher ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1979) 
(1861). 
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to have a satisfactory prospect of achieving a good life must engage in 
wide experiments in living in a society in which others are doing the 
same and we can all learn from one another’s experiments what kinds of 
plans of life are sensible in present social circumstances. 
From one’s own experiments in living and from observation of the 
experiments of others, one comes to acquire knowledge of the sort of 
person one is and the sort of plan of life that would be good to lead.  A 
good plan balances efforts at go-getting, changing one’s circumstances 
to make them more favorable, and efforts at self-culture, changing 
oneself so one is better able to adapt successfully to whichever 
circumstances one encounters.  Choosing and executing a plan of life in 
the light of knowledge of oneself and the world gained from experiments 
in living and improving one’s traits as appropriate according to the plan 
are what Mill calls developing one’s individuality.7  Being the creatures 
we are, and inhabiting the environment we do, developing individuality 
is necessary for having a reasonable prospect of a good life.8 
General knowledge of the human good, of what counts as genuine 
perfectionist accomplishment that is associated with higher rather than 
lower pleasures, is necessary for carrying out self-development as Mill 
envisages it.  When I am trying to discover what mode of life suits me, I 
am not merely looking for what feels good, but for a match between 
what I am capable of doing and capable of persevering at trying to do 
and what would make my life more rather than less worthwhile if I 
succeeded in doing it.  Would I be better off being a respectable skilled 
carpenter or a barely competent slothful professor?  Undertaking a risky 
marriage or adhering to a somewhat isolated spinsterhood?  And so on.  
Of course, we do not actually make these life choices motivated by ideal 
desires to achieve the highest goods for self and others, but in the society 
of free experimentation, driven by our actual motives, warts and all, we 
end up over the long haul with greater aggregate “utility in the largest 
sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive 
being.”9  That is Mill’s conjecture anyway. 
Mill sometimes appears oddly euphoric when writing about how great 
life will be under the regime of utilitarian liberalism,10 but his argument 
does not need that optimism in order to succeed.  Suppose less optimistically 
that the lives most of us reach under the rule of Millian liberty would be 
gray mediocrity or worse.  All Mill needs to demonstrate to defend his 
version of liberalism is the proposition that however bad the aggregate 
 
 7. MILL, ON LIBERTY, supra note 6, at 121–38. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 81. 
 10. See, e.g., id. at 127–29. 
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perfectionist human good score would be in societies regulated by his 
proposed liberal principles, the outcomes under more restrictive sets of 
rules would be even worse. 
Critics of Mill’s arguments for liberty have doubted his success  in 
showing that adherence to strict no paternalism according to his liberty 
principle is the best strategy for maximizing perfectionist good.11  His 
arguments regarding individuality and liberty plausibly show that wide 
individual freedom is needed for people to have a good chance of 
developing individuality, which they need to have a good prospect of a 
good life.  But wide individual liberty is compatible with some judicious 
paternalism.  The ideal regime of liberty might include enormous free 
scope for experiments in living although this regime remains lightly 
hemmed in by paternalistic laws.  For example, the ideal regime might 
require seatbelts in cars and protective headgear for motorcyclists, prohibit 
the sale and use of some hard drugs used for recreational purposes, and 
impose food and drug regulation and medical licensing requirements.  
That is as may be.  However, even if Mill’s arguments fail to generate 
knockdown arguments for his extreme absolutist liberty principle, they 
still support an enormously strong presumption for individual liberty and 
against arbitrary restriction. 
After this detour, we return to Isaiah Berlin and William Galston and 
those who claim to discern some arguments supporting liberalism in the 
thesis of value-pluralism-and-incommensurability.  Galston has correctly 
observed that if the thesis were correct, then one cannot appeal to value-
monism-and-commensurability to support illiberal politics that deny 
people negative liberty.12  My response is that if the thesis were correct, 
then one cannot appeal to value-monism-and-commensurability to 
support liberal politics that guarantee wide scope for negative liberty.  
So the thesis is evenhanded in its impact and does not tilt in favor of 
liberalism.13  Against the suggestion that maybe there are no powerful 
arguments for liberalism that appeal to value-monism-and-commensurability, 
so the loss of such arguments is no setback for the liberal cause, I 
pointed out historical evidence to the contrary.  Arguably the most 
 
 11. See Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, 56 MONIST 64 (1972). 
 12. See Galston, supra note 3, at 804–05. 
 13. On the question, “does value pluralism provide reasons that on the whole support 
liberalism in politics?,” my answer is in broad agreement with that offered in JOHN 
GRAY, ISAIAH BERLIN 141–68 (1996). 
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powerful arguments for liberalism we have are those of Mill, who makes 
just such an appeal in developing his arguments.14 
III.  NO RATIONAL BASIS FOR RESTRICTIVE POLICIES? 
Another possible way in which Isaiah Berlin’s claims about value 
pluralism and incommensurability might lend argumentative support to 
liberalism broadly construed is as follows.  Perhaps there is only one 
possible argument or set of arguments for Stalinism that has any color of 
plausibility, and this cluster of arguments is defeated if appeals to claims 
about human good inconsistent with value pluralism and incommensurability 
are disallowed.  In contrast, maybe good arguments for liberalism 
remain standing even if the appeals to monism and commensurability 
are disallowed.  In that case, it would advance the liberal cause if one 
could find good reasons to affirm pluralism and incommensurability.  
Success in that venture would cut off the one possible strategy for 
defending illiberal politics and leave the field open for some viable 
arguments for liberal politics. 
The line of thought sketched above fits Galston’s thinking.  He writes: 
Because there is no single uniquely rational ordering or combination of such 
values, no one can provide a generally valid reason, binding on all individuals, 
for a particular ranking or combination.  There is, therefore, no rational basis for 
restrictive policies whose justification includes the assertion that there is a 
unique rational ordering of value.  If value pluralism is correct, then as Steven 
Lukes puts it, “For the state to impose any single solution on some of its citizens 
is thus (not only from their standpoint) unreasonable.”15 
This argument is too swift.  If there are plural values and no ranking of 
them can be defended, then one cannot claim that in organizing society 
to maximize the single value X, one is maximizing what is best.  But 
equally no one can object to making X the politically privileged value 
on the ground that better outcomes would be obtained if we let a 
thousand flowers bloom, so values A through W would be achieved, the 
great flourishing of these many values being more than adequate 
compensation for the loss in achievement of X that would accompany 
 
 14. Mill’s arguments appeal to utilitarianism, the view that one morally ought always 
to do whatever would most advance the aggregate sum of well-being in the long run.  
This appeal strikes some as highly controversial and very likely illiberal at root.  On this 
topic, one might see Mill’s arguments as having force to the degree that there is a 
significant beneficence component in morality—the implications of which Mill charts—
even if the beneficence principle is accompanied by familiar deontological constraints.  
The more weight the beneficence component of morality has by comparison with the 
rest, the more decisive Mill’s arguments for liberty, to the degree that they succeed in 
their own terms. 
 15. GALSTON, supra note 2, at 57–58 (footnote omitted) (quoting STEVEN LUKES, 
MORAL CONFLICT AND POLITICS 20 (1991)). 
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the liberalization of society. Nor can anyone defend a policy of 
refraining from giving pride of place to some single value or set of 
values in the political arrangements of society by appeal to the loss of 
value that would ensue if we did entrench some value or values as 
privileged.  Incommensurability entails that we lack a scale on which 
such measurements could be made.  In other words, from the assumption 
of incommensurability one gets incommensurability, and thus no basis 
for choice one way or another—not even the slightest hint of a tilt 
toward liberalism and wide guarantees of negative liberty. 
Galston, Berlin, Lukes, and company are evidently assuming that the 
default position is liberalism.  No argument is needed to support the 
default.  If no good argument is put forth for moving away from the 
default, then there we should remain.  But this argument only succeeds if 
there is some prior argument that puts Berlinesque liberalism in the 
default position.  I do not see such an argument offered in the writings of 
these authors, nor any sense that such an argument is needed. 
The missing argument cannot consist merely in noting that negative 
liberty is a value, a human good.  Let us grant that premise.  So if we 
establish a Stalinist regime, we end up with less of this negative liberty 
value than we would have if we established a nice liberal regime.  But so 
what?  So long as there is some other value—however trivial you or I 
might think it to be—that the Stalinist society achieves to a greater 
degree than would be achieved under liberal auspices, then in the 
framework of value pluralism and incommensurability, nothing can be 
said that favors establishing liberalism rather than Stalinism.  Suppose 
there are plural values A through X and no rank ordering of the values, 
no commensurability.  In that case, one could maintain that one social 
policy or constitution of society is preferred to another on the basis of 
the degree to which the policy or constitution promotes the plural value 
if, and only if, a dominance relation holds: the one society achieves more 
of at least one value and just as much of each of the others as the 
alternate society.  So if Stalinism would gain less of values A through W 
than liberalism and more of just one value, say colorful military parade 
beauty, then Stalinism, by the Isaiah Berlin measure of value, is neither 
better nor worse in achievement of human good than liberalism or any 
other undominated possible alternative form of society. 
There is yet another reason to reject the inference from value 
pluralism and incommensurability to any sort of presumption in favor of 
liberalism.  Value pluralism as espoused by Berlin and Galston is 
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supposed to be consistent with knowledge that there are bads, evils that 
impede any form of human flourishing, and that restriction of liberty as 
necessary to reduce the great evils to acceptable levels is morally 
acceptable and probably morally mandatory.  Incommensurability of 
human good is supposed to be compatible with commensurability of 
human bad.  But within the framework set by these claims about value 
and disvalue, there is room for what one might call a Brechtian strategy 
of argument in favor of extensive state restriction of individual liberty 
beyond what liberalism as standardly conceived countenances.16  The 
idea is that human nature is prone to selfishness, aggression, and greed, 
and needs to be tightly reined in by social controls if humans are to have 
reasonable prospects of living decent lives.  The Stalinist might argue for 
tight restriction of market economy relations on this ground. 
The Stalinist might also argue against wide toleration of diverse ways 
of life and division of society into a plethora of associations and 
subcommunities organized around diverse comprehensive conceptions 
of the good life.  According to the Brechtian vision, the bonds of 
community necessary for decent social life are fragile.17  To preserve 
these bonds, keeping predation and aggression within check, it may well 
be necessary to foster a single sense of community organized around 
some single conception or set of similar conceptions of human good.  
State power is then deployed for some ways of life and against others, 
against the guarantees of negative liberty that liberalism cherishes, not 
on the ground that some ways of life and conceptions of the good are 
objectively superior to others but rather on the ground that the attempt to 
encourage people to fan out and embrace ways of life that achieve many 
different goods is inimical to the achievement of any.  To keep the great 
evils in check, negative liberty to pursue one’s own good in one’s own 
way needs to be curtailed.  The claim then is not that some single way of 
life is intrinsically better than others but that sustaining a single way of 
life oriented around some small subset of the universe of human goods is 
instrumentally valuable for preventing an explosion of the bads. 
The Brechtian Stalinist I am imagining argues against wide individual 
freedom not on the ground that individuals left free will head off in 
various directions away from the One True Good, but rather on the 
ground that individuals left free will head off in different directions in a 
 
 16. See BERTOLT BRECHT, THE CAUCASIAN CHALK CIRCLE (Eric Bentley trans., 1999) 
[hereinafter BRECHT, THE CAUCASIAN CHALK CIRCLE]; see also BERTOLT BRECHT, The 
Measures Taken, in THE JEWISH WIFE AND OTHER SHORT PLAYS 75 (Eric Bentley trans., 
1965). 
 17. This theme emerges in the setup of the story of the judge Azdak within The 
Caucasian Chalk Circle.  See BRECHT, THE CAUCASIAN CHALK CIRCLE, supra note 16, at 
63–85. 
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way that erodes elementary social solidarity and generates social conflict 
that causes Many Objective Bads.  Liberal toleration leads to the lessening 
of some people’s willingness to cooperate in the ways needed to sustain 
minimally decent social relations.  A variant of this argument claims that 
given wide individual freedom, too many people will aim at bads that 
have the tempting appearance of goods, so heavy restriction of liberty is 
needed not to achieve utopia, but to block the emergence of dystopia. 
These arguments rehearse familiar conservative critiques of 
liberalism, which I myself do not find especially compelling.  However, 
I want to note that certain familiar liberal strategies for responding to 
these arguments are unavailable to the Berlin-Galston value pluralist.  
The familiar strategies concede that sometimes people may exercise 
negative liberty by developing communities and associations and 
enterprises oriented around sharply conflicting values and setting people 
at odds.  However, these costs are tolerable in light of the great goods 
that liberal freedoms promote.  This strategy of argument presupposes 
some commensurability across goods and bads, and any such 
commensurability is unobtainable within the value pluralist framework 
of assumptions.  The value pluralist liberal must argue against the 
conservative and the Stalinist with one hand tied behind her back, and it 
is far from clear that she can win the argument with these ground rules in 
place. 
I should acknowledge straightaway that the position for which I am 
contending cannot be conclusively established by argument.  At least, I 
can provide no knockdown argument.  The value pluralists say that the 
thesis of value pluralism and incommensurability supports liberalism.  I 
demur.  They suggest arguments.  I try to poke holes in those arguments.  
However, I have no general proof to the conclusion that no argument 
supporting liberalism contains value pluralism and incommensurability 
as an essential premise.  The most I can do is throw cold water on 
arguments currently on offer and record my skeptical doubts that further 
arguments are forthcoming that will succeed where these fail. 
IV.  EXPRESSIVE LIBERTY AND VALUE PLURALISM 
My critical enterprise may seem misguided and churlish.  Galston 
does not claim that value pluralism alone supports liberalism.  Value 
pluralism is alleged to be one of three pillars of support—one leg in a 
three-legged stool.  Another pillar is a presumption in favor of according 
people the liberty to live “as they see fit, within a broad range of 
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legitimate variation, in accordance with their own understanding of what 
gives life meaning and value.”18  Galston calls this “expressive liberty.”19  
The third is political pluralism, the idea that there are legitimate sources 
of authority other than the state. 
I readily grant, from the premise that there is a presumption in favor of 
letting people live according to their convictions plus the premise of 
value pluralism, that you can validly derive the conclusion that there is a 
presumption in favor of letting people live according to their 
convictions.  Value pluralism is not a premise that by itself destroys or 
erodes a given claim to liberty.  What I do not so far see is how value 
pluralism enhances or strengthens any claim of liberalism you may be 
inclined to assert on independent grounds. 
Galston’s line of thought is that if we start from a presumption in 
favor of letting people live as they choose, and add the idea that there are 
many values that cannot be ranked against each other, then there is wide 
scope for liberty—the presumption applies to a wider sphere.20  
However, the point I have made already still applies.  The thesis of value 
pluralism denies to the advocate of negative liberty the claim that over 
the long run individuals are more likely to achieve the good rightly and 
monistically conceived if accorded wide individual liberty.  This is the 
Millian claim already discussed.  So value pluralism, so far as the 
defense of liberty is concerned, looks to me to be a wash—it takes away 
one argument and gives another.  If we hand ourselves a presumption in 
favor of expressive liberty and add the Millian monistic defense of 
liberty, the presumption is strengthened.  If we hand ourselves the same 
presumption and add value pluralism, the presumption perhaps gets a 
boost, but I do not see that it gets more of a boost than under Millian 
monism.  Value pluralism, so far as I can see, yields no net gain in terms 
of arguments supporting leaving people free to live as they choose—so 
long as they do not harm others in certain ways that violate their rights, 
this is common ground between Galston and Mill. 
The boost to the presumption for liberty that value pluralism provides 
strikes me as decidedly limited—perhaps more limited than the 
counterpart boost available to the believer in monism and commensurability.  
Left free, people might pursue what is bad, as determined from the 
standpoint of the plural incommensurable goods that the value pluralist 
affirms.  Value pluralism as such does not provide any boost to the 
presumption for liberty in this case—if anything, the opposite.  The 
Millian liberal position provides grounds to disfavor coercive 
 
 18. GALSTON, supra note 2, at 3. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 29–30. 
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paternalism in such a case.  The individual will learn from his mistakes, 
perhaps, and be toughened by struggling with them, and at any rate 
others will learn from the negative results of people’s experiments in 
living.  The value pluralist needs analogues of such arguments to 
strengthen her presumption for liberty—mere assertion of value 
pluralism and incommensurability does not work here.  Also, even if an 
individual is pursuing a conception of good that is among those the value 
pluralist affirms, she might be pursuing it ineptly and social interference 
might nudge her toward paths more likely to be fruitful from the 
standpoint of achieving the values she seeks.  There is a lot of normative 
space in which the affirmation of the presumption for liberty, along with 
value pluralism, might be coupled with, and outweighed by, doubts 
about the ability of most people in a wide array of circumstances to 
organize their lives effectively to achieve their values as they conceive 
them. 
We should also note that the presumption in favor of expressive 
liberty might take a form such that assumptions about the nature of value 
are simply irrelevant to the strength and reach of the presumption.  One 
might hold as a matter of individual right that people should be left free 
to live as they choose so long as they do not harm nonconsenting others.  
They do not lose this moral right just because they abuse it or use it 
ineptly.  The moral right to liberty is taken as rock bottom, not a 
provisional or rebuttable claim that needs further support.  The right to 
liberty in other words might be asserted on deontic grounds not value-
theoretic grounds.  I mention this just to indicate that it is unclear to me 
exactly what moral principles the value pluralist means to affirm in 
conjunction with value pluralism and expressive liberty, or how 
assumptions about value—the good—are supposed to interact with 
assumptions about what is morally right in value pluralist liberal 
doctrine.  Notice also that the Stalinist might argue for strong restrictions 
of individual liberty, for example in the economic sphere, without 
making any appeals to conceptions of value, pluralist, monist, or 
otherwise.  The Stalinist might instead appeal to doctrines of moral right 
that are taken to be freestanding and independent of one’s commitments 
on the nature of the good.  For example, the Stalinist may endorse the 
prohibition of “capitalist acts between consenting adults”21 on the 
ground that such acts are inherently immoral. 
 
 21. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 163 (1974). 
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V.  EXPRESSIVE LIBERTY VERSUS LIBERALISM 
The presumption for expressive liberty that Galston takes as his 
starting point is a presumption for liberty to follow one’s convictions 
even if one would abandon those convictions if one were to engage in 
free critical reflection and scrutiny of them.  Nor does Galston’s 
liberalism find extra value in people’s living successfully according to 
autonomously chosen values as opposed to nonautonomously chosen 
values.  Individual autonomy figures as simply one among the many 
plural values and has no special status among them.  Some might value 
autonomous choice; some loyal obedience to tradition or innocent 
embrace of the ways we do things around here.  The state ought to 
promote wide toleration of ways of life and refrain from seeking to 
undermine those who fail to cultivate autonomy.  Regarding autonomy, 
the state should be neutral.  His stance against the idea that the liberal 
state should promote the value of autonomy is a signature feature of 
Galston’s doctrine of liberal pluralism.22 
This derogation of autonomy merits rejection.  A society that fully 
achieves the Galston ideal of expressive liberty could be one in which 
people, living freely according to their convictions, are mired in 
superstition, prejudice, confusion, and inconsistency.23 
If Galston’s downgrading of autonomy is a problematic feature of his 
account, I do not believe this problem can be traced back to his value 
pluralism.  An advocate of value pluralism and incommensurability could, 
with perfect consistency, embrace autonomy and hold that a just state 
should promote autonomy in citizens.  Let us grant that there are plural 
values and no rank ordering of them is possible.  In the next breath, we 
can affirm that it is intrinsically as well as instrumentally desirable that 
each individual should live according to convictions about the right and 
the good that have survived her own critical scrutiny and that she is 
disposed to reexamine and rethink when doing so is “appropriate.”24  
 
 22. GALSTON, supra note 2, at 20–24. 
 23. It might seem that I am being unfair to Galston.  Superstition, prejudice, confusion, 
and inconsistency are uncontroversial bads, so if cultivation of autonomy impedes them, 
cannot Galston endorse state policy that favors autonomy?  Reply: He could, and I say, 
he should, but he does not.  This is my critique.  But my point here hardly deserves to be 
called a “critique,” as I note toward the end of this section.  I am raising an issue, the 
adequate resolution of which would involve a long and difficult argument, which this 
comment does not pretend to launch. 
 24. The scare quotes around “appropriate” signal a difficult topic that needs to be 
treated with care.  The autonomous person is not obsessively and endlessly rethinking her 
commitments rather than acting to achieve them, but she is disposed to respond to warning 
signs that her commitments might be misguided and that reconsidering them here and 
now might be productive.  The right setting of these dispositions involves balancing many 
desiderata. 
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There are plural values, any one or combination of which might form the 
focal point of a worthwhile life, but the good life consists of autonomous 
embrace of values and successful pursuit of them, and the just state 
fosters autonomy as part of its project of helping citizens live 
worthwhile lives. 
Is this proposed synthesis of value pluralism and state commitment to 
autonomy plausible?  Galston can correctly point out that people can 
succeed in living what are surely lives of genuine value without scoring 
high on autonomy.  A member of a hunter-gatherer culture might simply 
follow the way of life of her tribe, but if she is lucky, the way of life 
might be a genuinely good one.  Moreover, it could be the case that 
achieving some valuable ways of life is incompatible with being 
autonomous.  What then? 
One might suppose that incommensurability removes the point of 
autonomy, which is to guide the individual toward better values—but 
better presupposes a commensurability that is not available.  This 
supposition is false.  First, given incommensurability, one still may well 
be in need of critical scrutiny of candidate values to avoid the bad—the 
weeds among the flowers—and find some incommensurable good.  For 
all I know, the traditions in which I have been raised, the conventions I 
have been trained to find natural and wholesome, might contain goods 
and bads intertwined rather than simple goods, or even some dominant 
bad masquerading as good.  To investigate this possibility, I need to 
think things through, and so I need the critical skills and habits of mind, 
and intellectual and moral virtues that enable me to do this and incline 
me to do so.  Second, nothing in the hypothesis that there are plural 
incommensurable values rules out the possibility that there are further 
definitely lesser values along with the select incommensurables.  Critical 
scrutiny and sifting and sorting of values may be necessary in order to 
find a conception of good and a way of life that is above the threshold of 
higher value at which incommensurability commences.  Third, to plan a 
life, I need to find values that mesh with my circumstances and my 
particular traits in such a way that pursuit of those values enables me to 
lead a life as good as any I might choose.  Fitting my traits and 
circumstances to values taken for granted may not yield the globally best 
plan for me, and a wider scrutiny that looks at various values I might 
orient my life around is needed.  In this way, discovery of values and 
choice of a life plan are part of one connected inquiry, successfully 
engaging in which is being autonomous. 
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Here one must be careful not to make a fetish of autonomy, which to 
my mind is more a tool than a goal.25  Galston has a point.  Good values 
are ones that would withstand ideal critical scrutiny, but one can, and 
people do, follow good values without actually engaging in any critical 
scrutiny.  Moreover, critical scrutiny can lead one astray.  Even if good 
values are the ones that one would affirm at the end of ideally extended 
inquiry, that ideal is in actual life unattainable, and nothing guarantees 
that the baby steps I take toward it will not lead me to discard perfectly 
good traditions and conventions in order to follow some cockamamie 
fad.  The less native capacity for rational inquiry I have, the smaller the 
chances that cultivating these capacities and exercising them will be 
more likely to steer me toward the good and the right than would the 
alternative strategy of uncritical conformity to the advice of a trusted 
authority: a village elder, a parish priest, a wise guru, or something 
comparable. 
Liberal doctrine exhorts people to become autonomous and asserts 
that the just liberal state promotes the development of autonomy in all 
minimally competent members.  The exhorting and asserting are done on 
the basis of a broad empirical conjecture—or leap of faith if you will.26  
The liberal faith is that on the whole and on the average—encouraging 
the individual to become autonomous is the best available strategy for 
bringing it about that people embrace sensible conceptions of the right 
and the good and follow sensible plans of life that maximize their 
chances of leading choiceworthy lives. 
To the extent that autonomy, cultivating and exercising one’s 
deliberative faculties in order to form one’s beliefs about the right and 
the good, is regarded as intrinsically valuable, a value pluralist like 
Galston is right to say this is one value among several.  It should be 
respected but not revered as a supervalue in a way that assumes a value 
commensurability that value pluralism denies.  However, in the liberal 
tradition, autonomy is also instrumentally valued, and nothing in the 
thesis of value pluralism and incommensurability has any tendency to 
make one skeptical about its instrumental value.  I am not at all skeptical 
about the instrumental value of autonomy and autonomy promotion.  
Galston is skeptical.  From a nonskeptical standpoint, expressive liberty 
as Galston conceives it is too thin a value to capture the core liberal 
 
 25. See the elucidation and assessment of the norm of autonomy in Richard J. 
Arneson, Autonomy and Preference Formation, in IN HARM’S WAY 42 (Jules L. Coleman 
& Allen Buchanan eds., 1994). 
 26. For related discussion as to how progressive political beliefs may rely on broad, 
vague empirical conjectures that might involve faith as much as reason, see Robert Merrihew 
Adams, Moral Faith, 92 J. PHIL. 75 (1995); see also Richard J. Arneson, Marxism and 
Secular Faith, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 627 (1985). 
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commitment to human freedom.  Nothing I have said in this essay 
provides any significant evidence that should change Galston’s mind or 
anybody else’s on this issue.  I simply want to make the point that being 
for value pluralism gives you absolutely no reason in itself to take 
Galston’s side in this dispute. 
In previous parts of this essay, I have urged that value pluralism does 
not give you any reason to be a liberal.  Value pluralism neither establishes 
nor supports a presumption in favor of individual liberty.  In this part, I 
have urged that value pluralism does not provide reasons that favor 
being one type of liberal rather than another—a Galston liberal rather 
than an autonomy favoring liberal.  This dispute turns on other 
considerations.  In this as in the other controversies, value pluralism is a 
bystander, not the supportive comrade Galston takes it to be. 
VI.  INCOMMENSURABILITY 
These comments have challenged an inference supportive of some 
version of liberalism that some have thought could be drawn from value 
pluralism.  I have not ventured any criticism of the claim of value-
pluralism-and-incommensurability itself.  In particular, I do not intend to 
insinuate that if this claim has unpalatable implications, we should reject 
it. Value pluralism and incommensurability are theses of moral 
metaphysics.  Whether they are true or false depends on how the moral 
metaphysical arguments go; we simply have to live with the results, be 
they palatable or unpalatable. 
“Value incommensurability” has been pretty much a placeholder in 
this discussion.  I simply take over the idea from Berlin and Galston and 
have not sought to clarify it.  Clarification is needed, however, before 
one could begin to assess the claim.  I cannot do that here.  Here is a 
simple way to think about the idea: suppose there are plural values, for 
example, friendship, pleasure, and intellectual achievement.  One might 
doubt that for any single value, one can specify what counts as an 
increment of it, such that one could cook up a scale and, in principle, 
measure the degree to which, over the course of her life, the individual 
achieves the value.  Suppose to the contrary that one can do that.  Given 
arbitrary scales for each of the values under review, one might well 
wonder whether there is an objective answer to the question, would there 
be more value, a greater contribution to a person’s overall well-being, if 
that person gains a specified quantity of friendship according to the 
friendship scale or instead a specified quantity of pleasure according to 
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the pleasure scale.27  Given the various combinations of the various 
values the person could achieve by alternate choices of how to live over 
the course of her life, is it in principle determinate, whether a given 
combination is better, equally as good as, or worse than another? 
With “yes” answers to these questions, one could write an equation 
that tells us, for any combination of goods one might get in one’s life, 
how much well-being one would then attain.  With “no” answers, there 
might still be zones of commensurability.  Even if there is some range 
within which adding to one’s store of friendship is neither better than, 
worse than, nor equally as good as getting a specified quantity of 
intellectual achievement, there might still be many comparisons beyond 
this metaphysically fuzzy range, where commensurability does hold.  
The extremes of full commensurability and no commensurability strike 
me as too extreme; I suspect the truth is some form of partial 
commensurability, some intermediate position.  Galston allows that 
particular assessments might be correct but denies that any correct 
general assessments can be formulated; I count this as an extreme denial 
of commensurability.28  The extreme position might be true, who 
knows?  It is worth pondering its implications.  Galston deserves much 
credit for pressing us to confront the issue.  I disagree with his claims 




 27. This way of putting the question may assume that the values do not interact 
when combinations of them appear in someone’s life.  Interaction might occur.  For 
example, pleasure taken in friendship might enhance the value of a given quantity of 
friendship, and pleasure taken in friendship might yield more valuable pleasure than 
pleasure taken in some other things.  If so, we need to identify more complex goods, to 
get a list of goods such that we can just add up the amounts of each good in a person’s 
life and sum the total to get the total well-being score. 
 28. See Galston, supra note 3, at 805–06. 
